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The European Union and Israel’s Occupation:
Using Technical Customs Rules
as Instruments of Foreign Policy
Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo
This article describes the rules of origin dispute between the European Union 
and Israel, and argues that these technical customs rules are also instruments of 
foreign policy. Although the rules have had no direct impact on Israel’s industry 
in the Occupied Territories, they have bolstered the European Union’s self-identi-
fication as a “normative power” while constituting an important legal precedent 
that has served to legitimize other actions against Israel’s occupation.
In January 2005, the European Union decided to implement fully the rules of origin 
(ROO) clause1 of the 1995 European Community (EC)–Israel Association Agreement2 
and to subject products manufactured in the territories Israel had occupied during the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war to customs duty. The EU’s decision spurred a scholarly debate 
about its legal basis,3 the implications it would likely have on Europe’s normative 
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positions,4 and on whether it is consistent with the EU’s policies involving rules of ori-
gin in other regions.5 Surprisingly, though, few scholars have examined the actual eco-
nomic and political implications of applying the ROO on Israeli products manufactured 
in the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Golan Heights.6 It is im-
portant to determine whether, for example, the implementation of the ROO has actually 
had an impact on Israeli industry in the Occupied Territories or on Israel’s settlement 
policies, since such questions help us gain insight into how technical customs rules can 
be deployed as instruments of foreign policy and whether they really have an impact.7
We begin with a brief overview of the ROO, followed by a description of the 
political processes leading to the EU’s decision to enact the ROO clause on products 
manufactured in Jewish settlements in the Territories. We claim that while the decision 
was carried out in accordance with the stipulations of the 1995 EC-Israel Association 
Agreement, the decision to apply the ROO was also informed by the EU’s displeasure 
with Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the 
Golan Heights. Hence, we contend that the implementation of the ROO should also be 
understood as a form of political conditionality carried out by the EU towards Israel. 
Next, we briefly describe the Israeli export industry in the Territories, showing that 
the application of the ROO has had no tangible impact on this industry, on the Israeli 
economy as a whole, or even the settlement project in particular.
We go on to explain why the direct impact has been insignificant, emphasizing 
that during negotiations the EU conceded that products from the Territories would 
continue to be labeled “Made in Israel,” because currently, with few exceptions, la-
beling rules are determined by each EU member state. We claim, however, that the 
application of the ROO has had an incremental impact, since the rules have influ-
enced some EU member states to begin addressing the labeling issue. They have 
further served as the basis for the publication of new EU guidelines prohibiting the 
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allocation of the EU’s funds to Israeli companies, public bodies, and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) working within the Israeli settlements (hereinafter “EU 
guidelines”).8 Finally, they have, even if by association, given legitimacy to the deci-
sion of private companies and financial institutions such as the Dutch cooperative 
Pensioenfonds voor Gezondheidszorg, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke (PGGM) 
pension fund to stop investing in five Israeli banks because of “their involvement 
in financing Israeli settlements” in the Territories.9 We conclude by advancing two 
arguments: First, the EU-Israeli case suggests that the current separation between 
the ROO and labeling rules defangs the ROO and therefore hinders the rules’ ability 
to become an effective instrument of European foreign political policy. Nonethe-
less, the ROO do have an incremental political impact, since they serve as the basis 
of legitimization for other policy decisions of the EU, member states, and private 
corporations. Second, the decision to implement the ROO has had two domestic ef-
fects: it has served to legitimize EU trade with Israel and to bolster the Union’s self-
identification as a “normative power.”10
THE RULES OF ORIGIN
Described as the economic nationality of products, the ROO outline the criteria 
used to determine in which country a product originates. The ROO are divided into 
two types: non-preferential and preferential. While the former is connected to enforc-
ing trade remedies of a general nature, such as antidumping and countervailing duties, 
as well as for compiling statistics on global trade flows, the latter is used exclusively 
within preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to determine which goods are eligible for 
a reduced tariff rate within a free-trade area.11 The ROO appear in practically all PTAs 
and are used primarily to prevent trade deflection — a situation in which a third country 
not party to a PTA ships a product through a country that is benefiting from the lower 
tariff and thus illegally enjoys a custom reduction.
The ROO are informed by two underlying assumptions. First, that the origin of 
a product can be determined, and second, that the territory from which the product 
originates is neither disputed nor occupied. Most of the difficulties involving the ROO 
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Territories Occupied by Israel since June 1967 for Grants, Prizes and Financial Instruments Funded by 
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ments/related-links/20130719_guidelines_on_eligibility_of_israeli_entities_en.pdf. For an analysis of 
the Guidelines consult Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo, “Normative Power Europe and the Power of 
the Local,” Journal of Common Market Studies (forthcoming), DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12162.
9. PGGM, “Statement Regarding Exclusion of Israeli Banks,” PGGM English-language web-
site, January 8, 2014, https://www.pggm.nl/english/what-we-do/exclusions/Documents/Statement-
PGGM-exclusion-Israeli-banks.pdf.
10. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 235–58. 
11. Olivier Cadot and Jaime de Melo, “Why OECD Countries Should Reform Rules of Origin,” 
World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 77–105; Hatem Mabrouk, “Rules 
of Origin as International Trade Hindrances,” Entrepreneurial Business Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010), pp. 
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have to do with the first assumption, because in reality many products are manufactured 
in several countries, in the so-called global factory.12 Hence, for the past four decades 
it has been acknowledged that ascertaining a product’s country of origin has become 
increasingly difficult with the internationalization of production processes. Over the 
years several economic tests have been developed to determine the origin of a product 
that is manufactured in several countries,13 and while disputes about this issue continue 
to arise, in this case the EU and Israel do not disagree about the origin of the products 
but rather about the legal status of the territory whence the products originate.
The second underlying assumption of the ROO is that political borders are both 
clear-cut and agreed-upon. This further suggests that issues relating to the origin of 
a product are interlaced with questions about legal territorial sovereignty,14 and in-
deed that the ROO presuppose such sovereignty. Currently, however, there are over 
20 disputed or occupied territories around the globe which either export goods or 
are believed to hold considerable natural resources. Moreover, each of the countries 
laying claims to these territories has signed PTAs, which include the ROO clauses, 
indicating that the legal status of the territory is of utmost importance. The Occupied 
Territories are among the few regions where the status of the territory has actually led 
to a serious examination of how it should affect the ROO clauses signed by Israel and 
therefore can serve as a case study for analyzing the use of the ROO as instruments 
of foreign policy.
CUSTOM RULES AS INSTRUMENTS OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY
By the end of 2008, the EU had 35 preferential trade agreements, making the 
Union’s network of PTAs the largest in the world.15 In addition to the liberalization of 
trade, the declared motivation of PTAs, particularly those signed with non-EU Mediter-
ranean countries in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also 
known as the Barcelona Process and, as of 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean), 
includes the promotion of political stability through economic prosperity. The idea, as 
Alan Winters point out, is to ensure against disruptive social or economic conditions that 
could spill over and adversely affect EU member states.16 Hence, the EU not only rec-
ognizes the economic importance and impact of the trade agreements it signs, but also 
claims to use them in order to advance political goals. The former European commis-
sioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, even avers that the EU’s trade policy is one of the key 
instruments to promote rule of law and respect for human rights, which he characterizes 
12. Joseph Grunwald and Kenneth Flamm, The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in International 
Trade (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).
13. For the three economic tests that are commonly employed to define the general principle more 
precisely consult Hirsch, “Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments?”
14. Hauswaldt, “Problems under the EC-Israel Association Agreement.”
15. Raymond J. Ahearn, “Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implica-
tions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, #R41143, March 3, 2011, www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf, p. 6.
16. L. Alan Winters, “EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Objectives and Outcomes,” in The 
External Economic Dimensions of the European Union, eds. Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 202. 
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as “the shared values that underpin the European construction.”17 The implementation 
of the ROO in this context should be considered as an EU attempt to reassert the Green 
Line (which Israel erased by, inter alia, building and expanding Jewish settlements) and 
a message to Israel that it will not be profitable to build industry in the Territories.
THE ROO AND THE 1995 EC-ISRAEL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
The fourth protocol to the 1995 EC-Israel Association Agreement defines the con-
cept of “originating products” and the methods of administrative cooperation between 
the parties to the agreement. The protocol specifies the origin criteria for different cat-
egories of products. Although the stipulations regarding the ROO are well defined, the 
agreement does not offer a specific definition of what constitutes the “territory of the 
State of Israel.” Based on the secret 1971 “Schuman Document on the Middle East,” 
the first official EC declaration on the Arab-Israeli conflict from November 6, 1973,18 
as well as several other declarations made over the years, the EU signatories to this 
agreement consider the “territory of the State of Israel” as the area within the borders 
determined by the 1949 armistice agreements. They subscribe to United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which serve for the 28 EU member states as the 
basic contours for any future agreement pertaining to the Territories and the creation 
of a Palestinian State. Israel, on the other hand, prefers to leave the exact demarcation 
of its borders ambiguous, not only because it unilaterally applied its civilian laws to 
East Jerusalem in July 1967 and the Golan Heights in December 1981, but because it 
considers the Jewish settlements in the West Bank as integral to the State.19
Ironically, perhaps, the European Commission raised the question of the origin of 
products produced in the Territories as a result of another investigation. In 1993, the EC 
suspected that Israeli orange juice producers were using Brazilian juice concentrate in 
products labeled “Israeli juice” in order to enjoy tax benefits under the EC-Israeli agree-
ment (a classic case of trade deflection). Although the European Commission was unable 
to find conclusive evidence of fraud, it published a “First Notice to Importers,” in Novem-
ber 1997, informing European Community importers that there were grounds for doubt 
about the validity of the origin certificates for orange juice coming from Israel and that the 
importers would be liable for duty recovery. This investigation into an issue unrelated to the 
Territories seems to have served as the impetus for questioning the origins of goods export-
ed to the Union from the territories Israel had occupied in 1967, since in the same notice 
the EU further informed European Community importers of problems relating to Israel’s 
implementation of the ROO regarding products from Israeli settlements in the Territories.20
17. Karel De Gucht, “Trade Policy and Human Rights,” (address, Socialists and Democrats Confer-
ence, “Can Trade Policy Improve Human Rights?” Brussels, October 13, 2010), available on the Euro-
pean Commission website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc_146727.pdf, p. 2.
18. “The Shuman Document on the Middle East, 13 May 1971,” Document 2/14 in Israel and the 
European Union, eds. Pardo and Peters, p. 101; “EPC Middle East Declaration, 6 November 1973,” 
Document 2/20 in Israel and the European Union, eds. Pardo and Peters, pp. 106–7.
19. Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008).
20. European Commission, “Notice to Importers: Importations from Israel into the Community,” 
Official Journal of European Communities, #C 338/12, November 8, 1997; available as Document 
4/16 in Israel and the European Union, eds. Pardo and Peters, p. 219.
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In May 1998, the European Commission concluded that according to UN General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions, no Israeli settlement in the West Bank, 
the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights could be considered part of the 
territory of the State of Israel. Thus, exports originating from Israeli settlements in the 
Territories did not qualify for preferential treatment under the terms of the EC-Israel 
Association Agreement, and, consequently, any origin certificates issued by Israel for 
goods produced in Jewish settlements contravened the agreement’s fourth protocol on 
the ROO and should have been brought to an end.21
Initially, Israel denounced the European declarations, characterizing them as an 
attempt to impose sanctions on Israel. The discussions surrounding this dispute were 
fractious and for several years the two sides failed to reach a satisfactory solution. The 
EU insisted on implementing the ROO not only due to its resolve to abide by the 1995 
agreement, but, as we explain below, also because the lack of implementation would 
contradict another legally binding agreement that it had signed. Consequently, Israel 
had to succumb to European pressure, and in December 2004, the EC-Israel Joint Cus-
toms Cooperation Committee drafted a “technical arrangement” to end this dispute. 
One month later, a new notice was issued to customs operators, informing them that 
“products coming from places brought under Israeli Administration since 1967 are not 
entitled to benefit from preferential treatment” under the agreement and therefore the 
full customs duty should apply to those products.22
THE “TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENT”
Under the terms of the arrangement that went into effect in February 2005, Israeli 
customs authorities are required to identify the place of production for all products 
exported to the EU. In other words, Israeli products from the Territories continue to be 
labeled “Made in Israel” but Israel is now obligated to indicate on all origin certificates 
the precise name of the city, village, or industrial zone, with its accompanying postal 
code, and where production conferring originating status has taken place. As we argue 
below, the ability to continue labelling these products “Made in Israel” was crucial to 
undermining the direct impact of the ROO on Israeli industry in the Territories, as well 
as on Israel’s settlement project.23
21. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament: Implementation of the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Matters 
between the European Community and Israel,” European Commission, SEC #695 final, May 12, 
1998, pp. 7–8; available as Document 4/18 in Israel and the European Union, eds. Pardo and Peters, 
pp. 222–23. Two further EU fact-finding missions to Israel, in September 1998 and October 1999, 
established that Israel was in breach of the provisions concerning the ROO. See Zemer and Pardo, 
“The Qualified Zones in Transition.”
22. European Commission, “Notice to Importers,” 1997, in Israel and the European Union, eds. 
Pardo and Peters, pp. 376–77.
23. Following the EU’s foreign ministers’ May 2012 “commitment to fully and effectively imple-
ment existing EU legislation and the bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products,” in 
August 2012, a “New Notice to Importers” was issued along with an up-to-date list of non-eligible 
locations. Operators were reminded yet again that “the preferential treatment will be refused to the 
goods for which the proof of origin indicates that the production conferring originating status has 
taken place in a location within the territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967.” 
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THE POLITICS INFORMING THE RULES OF ORIGIN
Officially, the EU insists that its decision to implement the ROO is a “technical 
matter.” Responding to Israeli claims that the imposition of the ROO was comparable 
to imposing sanctions on Israel, the EU’s commissioner for external relations, Chris 
Patten, stated in May 2001 at the European Parliament that:
preferential access to Community markets for exports originating in Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights 
“contravenes agreed rules of origin since these territories do not form part of the 
State of Israel under public international law.” . . . Our decisions will be entirely 
based on the law and its technical application case by case.24
This does not mean, however, that at least for some EU diplomats the decision 
to implement the ROO was a way of using technical customs rules as instruments of 
European foreign policy in order to try to change Israel’s policies in the Territories. In 
April 2001, The Telegraph reported:
The European Union is preparing to strip Israel of privileged trade access as a pun-
ishment for the use of ‘excessive force’ against the Palestinians. . . . This means 
Israel will no longer be able to get away with exporting duty-free goods made at 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as if they were Israeli products.25
Three years later, The Guardian affirmed that the decision to impose the ROO on 
Israel was due to “the EU’s displeasure at Israeli settlement policies, highlighting 
differences over the legitimacy of the pre-1967 border.”26 Hence, it appears that the 
motivation for implementing the ROO was not merely due to “technical reasons,” but 
also as an instrument for advancing European foreign policy; in this case, as a form 
of EU political conditionality in order to pressure Israel to stop fortifying its settle-
ment project in the Territories.
[Continued from previous page]
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bourg,” European Commission, Speech/01/222, May 16, 2001; available as Document 4/27 in Israel 
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EU DOUBLE STANDARDS?
In addition to the explicit claims of EU officials that the strict adherence to the 
ROO has been technical, scholars have argued that the EU’s decision is inconsistent 
with its policies in other regions. Eyal Rubinson, for example, compared the EU’s 
stance towards Israel’s occupation with its position on Western Sahara.27 He shows that 
even though Western Sahara is considered to be an occupied territory, the EU allowed 
Morocco trade benefits under its association agreement with respect to products (main-
ly from fisheries) originating from this region. The inconsistency of the application 
of the ROO suggests, in Rubinson’s view, that the decision to implement them in the 
Israeli case was not merely technical, but also informed by the EU’s desire to convey a 
strong political message to the Israeli government.
Others have also used the Western Sahara comparison to claim that the EU deci-
sion regarding the implementation of ROO with respect to the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights was politicized, and therefore informed by 
a degree of double standards.28 Following the July 2013 EU Guidelines prohibiting the 
allocation of the Union’s funds to Israeli projects in the Territories, Avi Bell and Eugene 
Kontorovich also used the Morocco–Western Sahara case to argue that “in adopting the 
Guidelines, the Commission has set a double standard: it has one rule for the Jewish state, 
and a different one for the rest of the world.” Not only do Bell and Kontorovich hold that 
the EU has set double standards, but based on this behavior and on the Union’s working 
definition of anti-Semitism, they conclude that the EU is an anti-Semitic entity.29
There is, however, a crucial difference between the two cases, whose significance 
all of these scholars fail to underscore. Namely, that in the Western Sahara case the EU 
had signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) only with Morocco and not with any other 
entity that lays claim to the disputed territory, while in this case the EU had also signed 
a FTA with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In February 1997 the EC 
and the PLO signed an interim association agreement on trade and cooperation for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority (PA) of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Protocol 
Three of the Interim Association Agreement defines the concept of originating products 
and methods of administrative cooperation.30
The existence of parallel FTAs with Israel and the PLO and the fact that both 
agreements include ROO clauses is vital. Simply put, if the EU did not implement 
the ROO clause in the 1995 Association Agreement it had signed with Israel, it would 
27. Rubinson, “More than Kin and Less than Kind.”
28. Hirsch, “Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments?”; Harpaz, “The Dispute over 
the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”
29. According to the EU’s working definition of anti-Semitism, such an act also includes “apply-
ing double standards [to Israel] by requiring of it behavior not expected or demanded of any other 
democratic nation.” Avi Bell and Eugene Kontorovich, “EU’s Israel Grants Guidelines: A Legal and 
Policy Analysis,” Kohelet Policy Forum Research Paper (Oct. 2013), http://kohelet.org.il/uploads/
file/EUs%20Israel%20Grants%20Guidelines%20A%20Legal%20and%20Policy%20Analysis%20
-%20Kohelet%20Policy%20Forum%20-%20Final(1).pdf, pp. 9–10.
30. EC-PLO, “Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement,” Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities, #L 187/3, July 16, 1997, available on the EU Directorate General for Trade 
website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc_117751.pdf.
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be in breach of the Interim Association Agreement it had signed with the PLO for the 
benefit of the PA. As was held by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 2010 Brita 
case,31 each of the two association agreements has its own territorial scope, and there 
is no overlapping between the two: the 1995 EC-Israel Association Agreement applies 
to the territory of the State of Israel (as per the 1949 armistice agreement), whereas the 
1997 EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement applies to the territory of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. For the ECJ, the customs authorities of each exporting country 
should have exclusive competence within their territorial jurisdiction to issue origin/
movement certificates. The ECJ emphasized that as a consequence, the 1995 EC-Israel 
Association Agreement cannot be interpreted in such a way as to compel the Palestin-
ian authorities to waive their right to exercise the competence conferred upon them by 
virtue of the 1997 EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement. It follows that the 1995 
EC-Israel Association Agreement “must be interpreted as meaning that products origi-
nating in the West Bank do not fall within the territorial scope of that agreement and do 
not therefore qualify for preferential treatment under that agreement.”32
More generally, state sovereignty, as John Ruggie maintains, is an attribute of 
“territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion,”33 
indicating that a given territory cannot, according to international law, have two legal 
sovereigns simultaneously. This does not imply that the EU’s decision regarding the 
implementation of the ROO lacked political motivation, but it does suggest that the 
claim about it being inconsistent or informed by a double standard is not accurate. 
In fact, the opposite is the case. The EU would be inconsistent and incoherent if it 
had failed to implement the ROO; the only way that the EU could ensure that its as-
sociation agreements were not in conflict with each other was by insisting that the 
ROO clause in the EC-Israel Association Agreement would be implemented. Lack of 
implementation, therefore, became a matter of legal incongruity, so that even Israel’s 
longstanding allies in Europe had to support it.
THE ROO’S IMPACT ON ISRAELI INDUSTRY IN THE TERRITORIES
Insofar as the EU’s imposition of the technical customs rules was aimed at put-
ting pressure on Israel to stop investing in its settlement project, then it is important to 
ascertain whether the implementation of the ROO has actually had an impact on Israeli 
industry in the Territories or on Israel’s settlement policies. According to a report by 
Who Profits, an Israeli NGO monitoring industry in the Territories, there are 136 com-
panies in the Territories that export goods to European countries. Of these, 125 have 
31. Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, No. C 386/08, 2010  EUR-Lex LEXIS, 
63 (ECJ, February 25, 2010). 
32. Firma Brita GmbH, 2010 Eur-Lex LEXIS 63, Paragraph 53; In this context one should also be 
reminded of the 2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the legal 
consequences of the construction of a wall in the Territories. The ICJ was of the opinion that Israel’s 
construction of the wall in the Territories was contrary to international law. International Court of 
Justice, “Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory,” International Legal Materials, No. 43 (2004), p. 1009.
33. John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1998), p. 180.
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offices in the West Bank, seven in the Golan Heights, and four have plants in both the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights. The majority of these companies (94) have head-
quarters inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders, while the headquarters of 35 companies are 
in the Territories, and the remaining are production plants of companies from Belgium, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The industry itself is made up of construction companies (36), low-tech manufacturers 
(34), food supplies and agriculture (29), banking and investment (12), security indus-
try (8), marketing (8), transportation (5), and communications, services and high tech 
(4).34 The implementation of the ROO on these companies entails the enforcement of 
customs duties on products exported to the EU.
While we do not have up-to-date data about the volume of exports from the Ter-
ritories, in 2003 these exports amounted to $120 million, comprising about 0.6% of 
Israel’s total exports during the same year.35  Since about 30% of Israel’s exports go to 
the EU,36 we can assume that about $40 million would have been subjected to customs 
duties. Accordingly, if the ROO were strictly imposed, it would have only a limited 
impact on Israel’s overall trade. However, Israel wanted to make sure that the imple-
mentation of the ROO would not have any impact whatsoever on the industry in the 
Territories, since the relocation of companies from the Territories back to Israel would 
have internal political consequences on the settlement project. Consequently, immedi-
ately after the EU and Israel reached their December 2004 “technical arrangement” on 
the ROO dispute, Israel established a “national compensation mechanism” for Israeli 
exporters from the settlements whose exports were refused preferential status by the 
EU’s customs authorities.
In its 2006 budget, Israel introduced a new budget line “directive number 320408: 
exporters’ compensation.” The directive explains:
the State of Israel has trade agreements with a large number of countries in the 
world. For political reasons, [EU] member states decided in recent years to prevent 
duties reduction as established in these agreements for Israeli products produced 
beyond the Green Line. Due to the resultant loss of income, the Government of Is-
rael compensates the farmers and industrialists operating beyond the Green Line.37
About $8 million were allocated for reimbursement in 2006,38 but by 2011, the money 
transferred to the fund was reduced to $3 million.39 In the fiscal years 2013 and 2014, 
this budget line was merged with three other budget lines under the title “various kinds 
34. All the data is from Who Profits, www.whoprofits.org.
35. State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter CBS), “Statistical Abstract of Israel, 
No. 55,” 2004.
36. In 2013, 34% of Israel’s imports (excluding diamonds) came from the EU and 32% of its 
exports (excluding diamonds) were directed to the European market; CBS, “Foreign Trade, 2013,” 
www.cbs.gov.il/www/presentations/maz_nis_2013.pdf, pp. 24–25.
37. State of Israel, Ministry of Finance (hereafter MOF), “Taktsiv ha-Medinah: Hatsa‘ah li-Shenot 
ha-Kesafim 2011–2012” [“State Budget: Proposal to Fiscal Years 2011–2012”], October 2010, http://
mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/statebudget/Budget2011_2012/Documents/Budget2011_2012.pdf.
38. Sapir Peretz, “Shokhvim ‘al ha-Gader” [“Lying on the Fence”], Globes [Israel], February 27, 2006.
39. MOF, “Pirte ha-Taktsiv li-Shenat 2011” [“Details of the Budget for the Year 2011”], Art. 
#0408, October, 2010, p. 5.
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of annual support,”40 and only about $1.9 million were allocated for the “national com-
pensation mechanism” for each fiscal year (we explain in the subsequent pages some 
of the reasons for the reduced allocations).41 Hence, we can conclude that the ROO 
has affected no more than 0.5% percent of Israeli exports. This exact figure was also 
confirmed by two different officials of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
who are working on EU-Israeli relations.42 Moreover, if the implementation of the ROO 
aimed at imposing an economic fine for being located in the Territories, then the State 
of Israel absorbs the cost and in this way guarantees that these companies do not lose 
capital. In this way, the State helps ensure that they stay in the Territories.
It seems that the companies themselves have introduced strategies to deflect the eco-
nomic and political impact of the ROO, primarily by obscuring the origin of the exported 
goods. As noted, the headquarters of most Israeli exporting companies in the Territories 
are not located in the West Bank or the Golan Heights, while some of the companies whose 
headquarters are in the Territories have outlets or plants inside Israel proper. At times, the 
manufacturing process of the exported good takes place in both Israel proper and the Ter-
ritories. All of this enables the Israeli companies in the Territories to use an undisputedly 
Israeli address when exporting settlement goods to EU markets and bypass the ROO.
There are further strategies to get around the ROO. As the deputy director general 
of the Arza Winery, located in the Adumim Industrial Park in the West Bank, explained: 
we are successful in overcoming the boycott by using other companies or distribu-
tors who are operating abroad. There is no direct export to the country of destination 
but rather through a third company. Sometimes we play with the label on the bottle. 
The English label states that we operate from Israel but it does not state that it is 
from Mishor Adumim, but rather from Adumim [Industrial] Park.43
The State’s funds used to reimburse companies that are obliged to pay customs duties 
dropped by over half from 2006 to 2011, which suggests that these strategies have 
been widely used.
Furthermore, we are aware of only two out of 136 Israeli companies in the Ter-
ritories that have actually moved back to Israel proper.44 It does not seem likely that the 
40. MOF, “Taktsiv ha-Medinah: Hatsa‘ah li-Shenot ha-Taktsiv, 2013–2014” [“State Budget: 
Proposal to Fiscal Years, 2013–2014”], Directive #325004, June 2013, http://mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/
statebudget/BUDGET2013_2014/Documents/MainBudgetFull_2013_2014.pdf, pp. 154–56.
41. MOF, “Pirte ha-Taktsiv li-Shenat 2013” [“Details of the Budget for the Year 2013”], Art. 
#500401, June 2013; MOF, “Pirte ha-Taktsiv li-Shenat 2014” [“Details of the Budget for the Year 
2014”], Art. #500401, June 2013. For a specific budget line per fiscal year see State of Israel, 
“Ma‘arekhet She’iltot Mekuvenet le-Taktsiv ha-Medinah u-Vitsu‘o” [“Online Query System for the 
State Budget and Its Execution”], http://religinfoserv.gov.il/magic94scripts/mgrqispi94.dll?APPNA
ME=budget&PRGNAME=takzivreq.
42. Interviews by the authors with senior officials at the EEAS, April 18, 2013, Brussels/Berlin; 
July 15, 2013, Ramat Gan; and November 13, 2013, Brussels.
43. Noam (Dabul) Dvir and Attila Somfalvi, “‘Herem? Gam ha-Falestinim ve-Gam ha-Yisra’elim 
Yipag‘u’” [“‘Boycott? Both Palestinians and Israelis Would Be Harmed’”], Yedioth Ahronoth, February 
3, 2014, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4483794,00.html. 
44. Interview by authors with Yara Sa‘di of Who Profits, January 30, 2012, Beersheba; Jodi Rudo-
ren, “Israeli Firm, Target of Boycott, to Shut West Bank Plant,” The New York Times, October 30, 2014, 
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/middleeast/sodastream-to-close-factory-in-west-bank.html. 
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major reason for relocating was due to the implementation of the ROO, since compa-
nies have not incurred any real financial loss, while the fact that the companies continue 
to label their products “Made in Israel” makes it extremely difficult to organize a con-
sumer front against their products. Therefore, the implementation of the ROO has not 
engendered a serious negative incentive for these companies to move.
Finally, since the implementation of the ROO, Israel has only further entrenched 
its settlement project.45 In 2013, 2,534 apartment units were under construction in the 
West Bank, more than double the amount the previous year (1,133).46 Between January 
and April 2014, the Israeli government announced that it would build a total of 6,672 
new units in the Territories, despite ongoing criticism from the EU.47 A March 18, 2014 
internal report written by EU diplomats stationed in Jerusalem and Ramallah under-
scored “the unprecedented surge in settlements activity” since negotiations resumed 
in July 2013. This, the authors of the report maintain, appears to be part of Israel’s 
strategy to use settlement construction and infrastructures “to expand Jerusalem deeply 
into the West Bank.”48
THE RULES OF ORIGIN AND LABELING LAWS
The implementation of the ROO and their deployment as an instrument of Euro-
pean foreign policy towards Israel has not directly bore fruit. One of the reasons for the 
lack of impact involves the December 2004 “technical arrangement” the EU hammered 
out with Israel, whereby the goods originating from the Territories continue to be la-
beled “Made in Israel.” The decision not to change the labels of Israeli goods produced 
in the Territories has to do with the fact that the ROO are not directly tied to labeling 
laws, and that with few exceptions labeling rules are decided by each EU member state. 
Currently, “the limited available tools” at the EU level consist of Directive 2000/13 on 
food labeling, which requires consumer labels on the “true origin” of goods,49 as well 
as Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices.50 Based on these “limited tools,” 
45. Neve Gordon and Yinon Cohen, “Western Interests, Israeli Unilateralism, and the Two-State 
Solution,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 6–18.
46. Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), “West Bank Construction Update,” Report on 
Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2014), p. 10, www.fmep.org/
reports/archive/vol-24/vol-24/PDF.
47. FMEP, “Settlement Expansion Announcements, 2014 (units),” Report on Israeli Settlement in 
the Occupied Territories (Mar./Apr. 2014), p. 5.
48. Amira Hass, “EU Diplomats Warn of Regional Conflagration over Temple Mount,” Haaretz, 
March 28, 2014, www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.582532.
49. “Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000,” Of-
ficial Journal of the European Communities, #L 109 (May 6, 2000), p. 29, Article 3(8), http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:109:0029:0042:EN:PDF. 
50. “Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005,” 
Official Journal of the European Union, #L 149/22 (June 11, 2005), Article 6, http://eur-lex.euro-
pa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:en:PDF; Of importance are also 
Regulation 178/2002 on food, that contains pro-labeling provisions which can be called into ac-
tion, see “Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 Janu-
ary 2002,” Official Journal of the European Communities, #L 31/1 (February 1, 2002), Article 16, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:031:0001:0024:EN:PDF; for the 
fruit and vegetable sectors, “Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 of 21 December 2007,” 
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in July 2014, the EU warned the Israeli agriculture ministry that it was not allowed to 
supply permits for the export of poultry which originates in the OT. The EU asked the 
ministry’s veterinary services unit to differentiate between products made in “Israel 
proper and those produced in the territories,” making it clear that “unless Israel comes 
up with a sufficiently effective mechanism,” it might impose a ban on all Israeli meat, 
poultry, and dairy products.51
A “non-binding EU code of conduct” on labeling settlement-produced food might 
be ready only by mid-2015, and the EU code “covering all exports, including wine and 
cosmetics, could take much longer.”52 An EU official interviewed by EUobserver in 
September 2012 even admitted that “the mixture of EU laws is so messy [that] ‘it could 
take years’ before a code of conduct on labelling of all settlement exports is ready” 
(emphasis added).53
Another legal obstacle involving the enforcement of labeling has to do with 
the fact that the EU signed two association agreements, one with Israel and the other 
with the PLO, and that both lay claim to the same territory. As was discussed earlier, 
according to the Brita case, it would be legally impossible to label Israeli goods 
produced in the Territories as “Made in Israel — Occupied Territories,” since goods 
from the Territories must enter EU markets only under the 1997 EC-PLO Interim 
Association Agreement.54
Both these obstacles are significant, and yet the upshot is that the 2004 “techni-
cal arrangement” ends up misleading consumers and makes it impossible for them to 
know the real origin of Israeli goods that are produced in the Territories. One can hardly 
expect that European consumers would use the European Commission’s list of non-
eligible locations and their postal codes in their daily shopping. Put differently, because 
the 2004 arrangement, with some minor exceptions, de-links the ROO from labeling, 
it has deflected potential consumer action against settlement products on the basis of 
the information made available to them. This is because the ROO operate in a top–top 
manner, in the sense that officials determine which products are not included in the 
PTA and impose upon them a customs duty. Thus, the pertinent information remains at 
the top and none of it is readily accessible to the end user. In this way, the ROO deflects 
the power of the local — in this case, EU citizenry — from weighing in through, for 
example, consumer boycotts. By contrast, and with some exceptions, labeling operates 
in a top–down manner. The labeling itself is determined by officials according to state 
laws, but the information about where the goods are produced is clearly marked and 
[Continued from previous page]
Official Journal of the European Union, #L 350/1 (December 31, 2007), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
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ulation (EC) No 479/2008 of 29 April 2008,” Official Journal of the European Union, #L 148/1 (June 
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The Jerusalem Post, September 2, 2014, www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/EU-
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52. Andrew Rettman, “Leading EU Countries to Stigmatise Israeli Settler Goods,” EUobserver, 
April 22, 2013, http://euobserver.com/foreign/119883. 
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ends up reaching EU citizens, which gives them an opportunity to act. The assumption 
here is that the EU citizenry have power, but they need knowledge in order to use it; the 
ROO does not provide them this knowledge, while labeling does. Hence, the de-linking 
between the ROO and labeling of most Israeli exports to European markets has effec-
tively disempowered EU citizenry and, in this way, has stripped the technical customs 
rules of their potential ability to have an impact on an active European foreign policy.
THE ASSERTION OF “AN ECONOMIC GREEN LINE” AND 
THE EU’S SELF-IDENTIFICATION AS A NORMATIVE POWER
Notwithstanding the lack of direct impact, the ROO’s implementation has had 
a number of interesting, if not always intended, effects on Israeli industry in the Ter-
ritories and Israel’s settlement project. Wittingly or unwittingly, when implementing 
the ROO, the EU did not seem to have taken into account Israel’s economic borders. 
Israel does not have two separate economies, one in the pre-1967 borders and another 
in the Territories. A 2010 research paper about Israeli banks, for example, shows that 
the banks in pre-1967 Israel:
provide[d] the financial infrastructure for all activities of companies, governmental 
agencies and individuals in the continuing occupation of Palestine and the Syrian Go-
lan Heights. The services provided by the banks support and sustain these activities.55
Moreover, the customs and monetary regimes are the same in pre-1967 Israel and in the 
Territories. It is therefore no surprise that most of the companies operating in the Terri-
tories have headquarters or plants in Israel proper, allowing them to avert the European 
customs duties by providing a postal code in Israel.
By promulgating the notion that Israel’s economy is severed from the occupa-
tion, the ROO provide the EU with normative legitimation to deepen its trade ties 
with Israel despite its displeasure with Israel’s settlement project, since the EU can 
accurately proclaim that it is simultaneously sanctioning Israeli industry in the Ter-
ritories. The problem with this strategy is that the use of customs rules to reassert a 
nonexistent economic border can to reinforce the existing status quo. Put differently, 
the implementation of the ROO has provided Israel’s economy normative legitima-
tion by inserting an imaginary distinction between Israel’s pre-1967 economy and its 
economy in the Territories.
Consequently, by imposing the ROO, the EU’s self-identification as a “norma-
tive power” is bolstered.56 This latter point requires further explanation. From its first 
attempt to craft a unified foreign policy in the early 1970s as the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), the EU understood that European identity would evolve as a func-
tion of the dynamic construction produced progressively through the member states’ 
55. The Coalition of Women for Peace and Who Profits, “Financing the Israeli Occupation: The 
Direct Involvement of Israeli Banks in Illegal Israeli Settlement Activity and Control Over the Pales-
tinian Banking Market,” Who Profits from the Occupation Report, October 2010, http://whoprofits.
org/sites/default/files/WhoProfits-IsraeliBanks2010.pdf.
56. Manners, “Normative Power Europe.”
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relation to other countries or groups of countries.57 By defining common positions to-
wards countries and other regions such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the 
EU constitutes its own identity as a distinct and unitary actor.58 Our claim is that as a 
form of normative power, the ROO serve to build the EU’s own identity and to solidify 
the unity among the member states.
The incentive to implement the ROO was, in other words, not only to impact 
Israeli policies in the Territories, but also to influence the identity of member states and 
their citizens by producing a common normative claim. The EU’s long-standing nor-
mative position that Israel’s occupation is illegal helps constitute its own identity when 
the discursive citation of this position is internalized within local European institutions, 
agencies, and legislation.59 For the normative position to be effective as a solidifying 
device, for it to be an inward bound mechanism that helps produce a unified identity, 
the norms — in this case the claim that Israel’s occupation is illegal — have to manifest 
themselves in actual policies and practices; they have to be seen, and not merely heard. 
In this way, the implementation of the ROO played a role in institutionalizing a norm 
that also has an inward bound role.60
THE RULES OF ORIGIN’S INCREMENTAL IMPACT
Although the ROO assert an imaginary economic border and have not had a direct 
impact on Israeli policies in the Territories, their implementation has produced an im-
portant legal precedent that has served to legitimize a series of other actions that, over 
the past decade, have taken place at three distinct levels: the supranational, national, 
and private, corporate/financial entities. While these actions have been propelled by 
numerous factors, all of them have in common the notion that conducting business with 
Israeli companies either located in the Territories or complicit in the occupation can be 
legally problematic. At the time of publication, it appears that the European campaign 
to boycott Israeli companies and institutions is gaining strength and we are witnessing 
the beginning of a snowball effect whereby these disparate actions are actually coalesc-
ing and together are beginning to influence Israeli decision-makers.
Chronologically, the implementation of the ROO impacted member states first. 
A few member states understood that the de-linking of the ROO from labeling in prac-
tice defanged the ROO clause, but decided to use the clause in order to legitimize the 
57. See for example Article 22 of the 1973 Copenhagen European Summit, excerpted in Cen-
tre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE), “Declaration of European Identity (Co-
penhagen, 14 December 1973),” CVCE website, December 18, 2013, www.cvce.eu/content/
publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf, p. 4.
58. Article 13 in CVCE, “Declaration on European Identity,” pp. 3–4. 
59. Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power 
Europe,’” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jun. 2005), pp. 613–36. 
60. Having said this, more research needs to be carried out on the impact the Union’s longstanding 
normative position regarding Israel’s occupation has had on EU identity, since as Thomas Diez has 
recently pointed out, treating normative power as constituting the identity of the EU “overrates the 
stability of the discourse and underrates the contested-ness of normative power as a core concept”; 
Thomas Diez, “Setting the Limits: Discourse and EU Foreign Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 
49, No. 3 (Oct. 2014), p. 330. See also Neve Gordon and Sharon Pardo “Normative Power Europe 
Meets the Israeli Palestinian Conflict,” Asia Europe Journal (forthcoming, 2015). 
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adoption of new national labeling laws. In 2008, the UK called on the EU to be stricter 
in its application of the 1995 EC-Israel Association Agreement, reminding Israeli and 
European officials that goods produced beyond the 1967 borders should be labeled as 
originating in Jewish settlements in the Territories. The UK holds that these products 
should be distinguished from Palestinian industrial, agricultural, and other goods.61
Along similar lines, in May 2012, the Danish Politiken newspaper reported that 
Denmark, then the rotating president of the Council of the EU, was planning to ban the 
labeling of products from Israeli settlements in the Territories as “Made in Israel.” Ac-
cording to the Danish foreign minister at the time, Villy Søvndal,
this is a step that clearly shows consumers that the products are produced under 
conditions that not only the Danish government, but also European governments 
do not approve. . . . It will then be up to consumers whether they choose to buy the 
products or not.62
The Danish moves followed reports of similar plans announced in May 2012 by South 
Africa’s government.63 On April 11, 2013, foreign ministers of 13 EU member states 
signed a joint letter to the Union’s high representative, Catherine Ashton, in which they 
noted that “the correct labelling of products is necessary to ensure our consumers are 
not being misled by false information.”64 All these countries understand that by de-
linking the ROO from labeling they have possibly misled their citizenry and have thus 
prevented them from using their power to influence both national and European foreign 
policies. In many of these countries there are current initiatives to introduce labeling 
laws that forbid settlement products to be labeled “Made in Israel.”
On the supranational, EU level, it appears that the ROO created the necessary 
legal groundwork for new guidelines prohibiting the allocation of EU funds to Israeli 
companies, public bodies, and NGOs working within the Israeli settlements.65 The 
guidelines cover the new EU research program Horizon 2020, which entered into ef-
fect in January 2014, replacing the Seventh EU Framework Programs for Research and 
Technological Development (FP7). Following the 1995 EC-Israel Association Agree-
ment and in line with the 2010 Brita ruling of the ECJ, the guidelines make it clear 
that the EU does not recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Territories, irrespective of 
their legal status under Israeli law.66 Hence, the guidelines are based on the same logic 
informing the ROO and use the Brita ruling as precedent, but expand it to include the 
dispensation of funds, grants, and awards to Israeli companies, NGOs, and institutions 
in the Territories.
61. Department for Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs (UK) (hereafter DEFRA), “Technical 
Advice: Labeling of Produce Grown in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” December 10, 2009, avail-
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62. Amira Haas, Barak Ravid, and Anshel Pfeffer, “Denmark to Ban Labeling West Bank Prod-
ucts as ‘Made in Israel,’ Report Says,” Haaretz, May 19, 2012, www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
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63. Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa), “General Notice: Notice 379 of 2012” Na-
tional Gazette, No. 35328 (May 10, 2012).
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65. EC “Guidelines on the Eligibility of Israeli Entities.”
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Finally, companies and financial institutions in different EU countries have begun 
divesting from Israeli institutions that are complicit with the occupation. These include 
PGGM, the largest Dutch pension fund, that decided to divest from Israeli banks,67 
and Denmark’s largest bank, Danske Bank, that decided to pull its investment from 
Israel’s Bank Hapoalim due to the latter’s involvement in settlement construction. Dan-
ske Bank’s decision followed its previous divestment from Africa Israel Investments 
Ltd., another firm that is involved in settlement construction.68 While there is no causal 
relation between the implementation of the ROO and the decisions of these financial 
institutions, the ROO and the Brita ruling draw a legal distinction between pre-1967 
Israel and the Territories — suggesting also that Israel’s presence in the latter is illegal 
— that is pertinent to all European institutions. In this way, it serves both as the legal 
foundation and as a mechanism of legitimization for the decisions reached by these 
financial institutions.
CONCLUSION: 
THE RULES OF ORIGIN AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
While we agree with Hirsch that the rules of origin (ROO) “may promote the 
foreign policy interests of a country or economic block [sic],”69 we believe that the 
ways and extent they impact politics are extremely complex. We began by showing 
that the implementation of the ROO had no direct impact on Israeli industry in the Oc-
cupied Territories or on Israel’s settlement project. Simultaneously, the imposition of 
the ROO clause created an imaginary economic border between pre-1967 Israel and the 
Territories and, in this way, helped legitimate business as usual between the European 
Union and Israeli firms. The implementation of the ROO justified the preferred trade 
agreement (PTA) between the two parties. Thus, initially it appears that if the ROO had 
an impact, it was unintended and even contradicted the original objective of implemen-
tation. Imposing the ROO did, however, serve to bolster the EU’s self-identification as 
a “normative power.” In this sense, the implementation of ROO has played a role in 
institutionalizing a norm that has an inward bound role.
Finally, we claimed that the implementation of the ROO and the Brita ruling have 
also had an incremental effect in that they created a legal precedent that helps justify 
the initiation of a series of other actions that use commerce to underscore the illegality 
of Israel’s occupation. Providing a number of examples, we showed that these actions 
take place on three levels: supranational, national, and private, corporate/financial in-
stitutions. While more research needs to be carried out, it appears that together these 
actions produce a normative web that makes demands on Israel, on other EU institu-
tions, and on private entities so that they too will adopt a similar normative position.
67. PGGM, “Statement Regarding Exclusion of Israeli Banks.”
68. Barak Ravid, “Denmark’s Largest Bank Blacklists Israel’s Hapoalim Over Settlement Con-
struction,” Haaretz, February 1, 2014, www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.571849. 
69. Hirsch, “The Politics of Rules of Origin,” p. 320. 
